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Abstract: The aid effectiveness has become a long-lasting and controversial debate in 
the literature. To complement the concerned literature, this paper aims to address the 
question of whether foreign aid plays a crucial role in widening or narrowing income 
inequality. To do so, we employ a large dataset covering twenty-seven countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa over the period 1990-2011. We find evidence of an inequality increasing 
effect of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, this effect can reverse when the 
corruption is controlled.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign aid, in particular Official Development Assistance (ODA), has been regarded as a 
key for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Over the last 
decade, net ODA grew by 63% (almost US$ 50 billion), reaching a peak of US$ 128.5 billion 
in 2010. Despite a slight fall due to the global economic recession, at the end of 2011, ODA 
constitutes 7% (an estimated minimum of US$1.7 trillion) of international resource flows to 
developing countries. The main objective of giving ODA is to promote the economic 
development of developing countries. In other words, ODA has been considered as one of 
the most important factors, which can resolve the poverty and income inequality problem by 
fostering sustained economic growth in the developing world.  
However, so many countries register low per capita income after receiving enormous 
amounts of foreign aid (Ali and Isse, 2004). That is why the role of foreign aid in fostering 
economic growth has become a relevant issue in the literature. Despite of the vast theoretical 
and empirical literature, the effectiveness of foreign aid has been still a long debated and 
controversial issue. For instance, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find evidence of the positive 
impacts of foreign aid on the economic growth of a country with a sound institutional 
environment. By contrast, Easterly (2003) shows that foreign aid does not have any 
significant effect on growth, even if the recipient countries implement good policies. 
Furthermore, the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth is inclusive in other 
studies (e.g. Mosley et al., 1987; 1992).   
Unlike an extensive literature, which seeks to examine the impacts of foreign aid on 
economic growth, the direct link between foreign aid and income inequality has been still 
underdeveloped. So that, to complement the concerned literature, this paper tends to 
investigate the aid – income inequality nexus, by using a wide dataset of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) countries over the period 1990 – 2011. In fact, over the last decade, Sub-Saharan Africa 
receives more ODA than any other region. ODA flow to this region reached $80 billion and 
$125 billion in 2008 and 2010, respectively with ODA per poor person averaging $97 per year 
over the period 2008-2010. While SSA countries have experienced a vast volume of foreign 
aid inflow, the expected positive impacts of ODA on their economic performance have not 
been clear-cut. Mosley et al. (1987) argues that in contrast to such an important value of ODA 
inflow, SSA countries have continually showed high levels of unemployment and absolute 
poverty, low GDP per capita level, high mortality rates, low level of education, and lack of 
access to health care facilities. Thus, SSA region seems to be a counterexample to the positive 
impacts of ODA on economic growth. In detail, when ODA inflows reduced to 28 percent, 
economic growth rate became positive from its declining state and grew to 1.1 per cent. By 
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contrast, when ODA into SSA countries increased, economic growth rate declined, implying 
that aid has not been effective in SSA countries. On the other hand, the authors also show 
that together with an increase in ODA, GDP per capita figures declined across most of SSA 
countries. More recently, Moyo (2009) indicates that the billions of dollars in aid sent from 
wealthy countries to developing Africa nations, in particular SSA region, has not helped to 
reduce poverty and increase growth. Accordingly, poverty levels continue to escalate and 
growth rates have steadily declined and millions continue to suffer. In this context, the 
welfare impacts of foreign aid in SSA countries, more than ever, should be questioned in the 
rigorous studies. Therefore, in this study, we tend to address the question of whether foreign 
aid plays a crucial role in widening or narrowing income inequality in SSA countries.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the concerned 
literature. Section 3 provides an overview on the trends of ODA and income inequality in 
SSA countries. Section 4 explains the econometric approach. This is followed by the data 
description. Sections 6 presents and analyzes the empirical results. Concluding remarks are 
in Section 7.  
 
2. Literature framework 
The question about the effectiveness of foreign aid has been addressed in an extensive 
literature. The first strand focuses on the impacts of foreign aid on economic growth. Taking 
into account a “two-gap” model, Chenery and Strout (1966) argue that foreign aid can 
eliminate the investment – saving gap and exports – imports gap in less developed countries.  
This allows dissolving the “vicious circle of poverty” and connecting poor countries to the 
virtuous circle of productivity and growth.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) challenge the literature on the aid eﬀectiveness when they 
suggest that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, 
monetary, and trade policies, while with the presence of poor policies, aid has no positive 
effect on growth. Moreover, the authors find no evidence that aid has systematically affected 
policies - either for good or for ill. The Burnside – Dollar result is first supported by Collier 
and Dollar (2002) and also launches the debate on the conditional impacts of foreign aid. In 
an empirical study, Easterly et al. (2004) revisit the relationship between aid and growth. The 
authors support the view of Burnside and Dollar (2000) that the impact of aid depends on the 
quality of state institutions and policies. Accordingly, there is no evidence that aid has the 
same positive effect everywhere. They also show that in the 1990s the allocation of aid to the 
less developed world favored countries with better institutional quality. Similarly, Ali and 
Isee (2004) confirm Burnside-Dollar finding on the one hand, and indicate a nonlinear 
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relationship between aid and growth on the other hand. In addition, they conclude that the 
relationship between aid and growth is sequential: more and more aid leads to lower 
economic growth. By contrast, foreign aid, according to Agénor and Aizenman (2010), is also 
very volatile and pro-cyclical in nature. Consequently, increased aid volatility can have a 
cataclysmic effect on macroeconomic shocks and contribute to the creation of output and 
poverty traps.  
On the other hand, a large number of empirical studies fail to establish a link between aid 
and economic growth. For instance, Mosley et al. (1987) find no evidence of a statistically 
significant correlation between aid and growth. This is due to the possible leakage of aid to 
non-productive expenditures in the public sector, and the transmission of negative price 
effects to the private sector. Consequently, the authors recommend that donor should 
allocate aid on countries with certain criteria for high effectiveness of aid. In a follow-up 
paper, Mosey et al. (1992) support a positive and significant association between aid and 
growth for the whole sample, while regressions for regional subgroups yielded no 
statistically significant relation. The authors conclude that the effect of aid on growth is 
country specific. More importantly, they suggest four stages of aid effectiveness: i) low aid - 
low growth: ii) high aid - low growth; iii) high aid – high growth; and iv) low aid – high 
growth. In a seminal contribution basing on a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model, 
Svensson (2000) also mentions that the macroeconomic effects of ODA are ambiguous even 
though it contributes to an important part of revenue in various recipient countries. On one 
hand, under certain circumstances, ODA inflows lead to an increase in government revenue, 
which in turn lowers the provision of public goods. On the other hand, aid may increase rent 
dissipation and reduce productive public spending. In sum, increased aid does not 
necessarily lead to increased welfare. 
Despite the lack of a robust positive correlation between aid and growth, the economists and 
policymakers start shifting their focus on the direct impacts of foreign aid on income 
inequality in recipient countries. Bourguignon et al. (2008) find that the distributional impact 
of aid is equality enhancing. Moreover, foreign aid has quite small impact on aggregate 
inequality indices, while more important effect is revealed on a decile by decile basis. The 
authors also argue that some of the favorable impacts of aid are decimated by the negative 
impact of trade restrictions imposed by high-income countries on potential income in the 
developing world.  
In another empirical study basing on the dataset over 1971-2002, Calderon et al. (2009) only 
find some weak evidence that foreign aid contributes to the improvement of income 
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distribution when the institutional quality is taken into account, however, this result is not 
robust.  
Unlike two above cited studies, Layton and Lielson (2008) find that foreign aid’s impact on 
income inequality is somewhere between zero and weakly positive. According to these 
authors, foreign aid potentially causes inequality to increase in the developing world, in 
which income inequality is already a huge problem. It means that the expected goal of 
foreign aid, which is to improve income distribution and living standards for the poor, is not 
being met, even worse is the fact that the opposite trend is potentially occurring. Using a 
sample of 88 developing countries, Bjørnskov (2010) also support the role of foreign aid in 
deteriorating income distribution in recipient countries. In detail, foreign aid in conjunction 
with democracy is associated with a higher share of income held by the upper quintile. It 
means that foreign aid leads to a more skewed income distribution in democratic developing 
countries, while the effects are negligible in autocratic countries. More recently, Herzer and 
Nunnenkamp (2012) support the result of Bjørnskov (2010) for a sample of 21 countries over 
the period 1970-1995. They indicate that aid exerts an inequality increasing effect on income 
distribution. In addition, this result is robust to different estimation methods, potential 
structural breaks, different inequality data sets, and possible outliers.  
Regarding the case study of SSA, Gomanee et al. (2005) tend to study the mechanisms via 
which aid should affect growth. They point out a highly significant positive effect of foreign 
aid on economic growth of SSA countries, accounting for the effect via investment. On 
average, each one percentage point increase in the aid/GNP ratio adds one-third of one 
percentage point to the growth rate. In the same vein of Gomanee et al. (2005), Armah and 
Nelson (2008) provide an empirical analysis on the growth effects of foreign aid for a sample 
of twenty-one SSA countries spanning 1995-2003. They also support a signiﬁcant foreign aid-
growth relationship. It suggests that increased aid to SSA region is one way to achieve the 
MDGs. To sum up, the effectiveness of foreign aid in SSA countries has been recently 
questioned. However the existing literature seems to only focus on the growth effect of 
foreign aid, but has not paid much attention to the aid – income inequality nexus. To 
contribute to the existing literature, the present paper aims to address the question of 
whether foreign aid widens or narrows income inequality in SSA countries.   
 
3. ODA and income inequality in SSA countries 
This section provides a set of stylized facts on the evolution of ODA inflows as well as 
income inequality in SSA countries.  
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3.1. Income inequality trends  
In terms of income distribution, and using traditional Gini measures,1 Sub-Saharan Africa is 
one of the most inequitable regions in the world. By 2010, six of the ten countries in the 
world with the most unequal income distribution were in SSA region (African Development 
Bank Group, 2012). SSA region has experienced a striking concentration of countries which 
suffer from remarkably high income inequality levels, such as Namibia, Comoros, South 
Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. As suggested by Bastagli et al. (2012), in 
SSA region, the average income inequality, as measured by the Gini, has fallen. However, 
income inequality levels in SSA are heterogeneous and vary across countries with different 
levels of income.  
<Insert Figure 1> 
As shown in Figure 1, a decreasing trend seems to be clearer for the case of low-income 
countries. For instance, over the period 1990-2011, we can observe a large decrease in income 
inequality in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and so on. By 
contrast, other countries, such as Ethiopia and Central Africa, have experienced an 
increasing trend in income inequality.  
<Insert Figure 2> 
Regarding lower-middle income countries, Figure 2 shows that there is a consistent and clear 
trend towards increasing inequality in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia. Particularly, in 
Ghana, the rising income inequality is having a drag effect on poverty reduction. As 
suggested in Africa Progress Report (APP, 2013), in Ghana, poverty fell between 1998 and 
2005, but due to income inequality rising, poverty fell by less than it should have. Precisely, 
the top 10% of national income has been getting richer while the bottom 40% has been 
getting poorer. Similarly, in Zambia, income inequality has been consistently rising since 
2003. Zambia’s Gini coefficient now stands at the extremely high level of 55%, measured in 
2010. However, in the rest of lower-middle income countries, the Gini coefficient remained 
high until the early 1990s and then started a downward trend. Among others, Nigeria has 
experienced a positive progress in reducing income inequality since 2009.  
<Insert Figure 3> 
In the case of upper-middle income countries, we observe a slight decline of Gini coefficient 
in Botswana and Namibia. However, in these countries, income inequality level is still high. 
Other countries, such as South Africa, Seychelles and Mauritius, show the stability in 
                                                 
1 In Todaro and Smith (2011, p. 208), the Gini coefficient is an aggregate numerical measure of income inequality 
ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The Gini coefficient for countries with highly unequal 
income distributions typically lies between 0.50 and 0.70, while for countries with relatively equal distributions, it 
is on the order of 0.20 to 0.35.  
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inequality level since the last of 1990s. Only Angola has evidenced a remarkable decline of 
Gini coefficient since 2005. Figure 3 shows that the Gini coefficient of Angola at a starting 
level of around 40% in 1995, rising steadily throughout the 1990s to reach a peak of 58.5% in 
2000, and then falling to 41.3% in 2009. 
In general, SSA countries have experienced some positive indications of progress but 
inequality is still at a very high level. On the other hand, as suggested by APP (2013), high 
inequality seems to be the main reason for the disappointing overall record on reducing 
poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Global research confirms the view that levels of income 
inequality matter significantly in determining global poverty projections. In other words, 
“economic growth is driving an increasingly unequal pattern of wealth distribution and 
weakening the link between growth and poverty reduction” in SSA region (APP, 2013, p.29). 
 
3.2. ODA trends 
Sub-Saharan Africa is known as the region where most LDCs are located and where most 
countries “oﬀ-track” towards the MDGs can be found. Thus, needless to say the poorest 
region in the world receives the largest volume of ODA relative to other regions. Since 2000, 
given a substantial increase in ODA from OECD countries, SSA region has received 
historically unprecedented volumes of aid. Of a total ODA envelope of $192.5 billion in 2013 
(at current price), SSA region received $45.2 billion (23.47% of the world ODA). In particular, 
SSA countries have received roughly the same amount of ODA (around 23% of the world 
ODA) since 1985.  
<Insert Figure 4> 
As shown in Figure 4, the largest proportion of ODA is channeled to sub-Saharan Africa. It 
also means that SSA countries would be more vulnerable to any eventual sharp decreases in 
development aid. Moreover, the share of aid in national budget has maintained an upward 
surge in 2000. For instance, ODA flows contribute to more than 50% of the government 
expenses in several SSA countries (Figure 5).  
<Insert Figure 5> 
At the extreme end of the scale, Liberia’s ODA/GNI ratio exceeded 130% in 2013. Relative to 
the size of SSA economies, the data shows that, once again, several SSA countries are most 
dependent on development aid. On the other hand, in 2012, among 30 countries registered 
ODA levels in excess of 10 percent of GNI, there are 17 SSA countries (Figure 6). On the other 
hand, ODA is heavily concentrated in a much smaller number of countries. For example, in 
2012, a large proportion of ODA in SSA came to Cape Verde (12.4%) and Seychelles (9.9%). 
In spite of being the largest ODA recipient, SSA has recorded the lowest performance in 
8 
 
ODA per capita. In 2010, in terms of ODA per capita, Oceania receives ODA ﬁve times more 
than sub-Saharan Africa (OECD-DAC, 2010).  
<Insert Figure 6> 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
The present paper aims to examine the relationship between foreign aid and income 
inequality in SSA region. Given this aim, our empirical strategy tries to make maximum use 
of both time and cross-country dimensions of available annual data set. Using annual data 
for any econometric estimation, we should assume that the annual observations on income 
inequality cannot represent long-run equilibrium values in any given year, because of slow 
adjustment to changes in other variables. To account for the possibility of partial adjustment, 
we specify a dynamic log-linear equation for income inequality, which includes a lagged 
dependent variable. We first estimate the following bivariate model, which is also considered 
in Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012):  
 
	
 =  + 	
 + 	 +  +                         (1) 
 
Where Inequalityit is an indicator of income inequality of country i in year t, Aidit represents 
foreign aid flows to country i in year t,  is a disturbance term assumed to satisfy the 
Gauss–Markov conditions, and  is a trend term allowing for a shift of the intercept over 
time. Equation 1 assumes that there is a possible relationship running from foreign aid to 
inequality and that no other variables are required to produce unbiased estimates of this 
relationship. However, there are several factors (such as economic growth, trade, foreign 
investment, and redistribution policies) that can affect inequality. Thus, following Tanzi 
(1998) and Roine et al. (2007), we introduce in the second income inequality’s model a large 
set of explanatory variables. The empirical model is formulated as follows:  
 
	
 =  + 	
 + 	 +  +  !" 
																																				+
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%&	
−1 + 6"*1	
−1 + 7!&,	
−1 + 7"*2	
−1 + 
 + 	
               (2) 
 
Where 	is a broad set of macroeconomic variables,  !" represents different 
indicators measuring the openness level of a country, %& is the financial development level, 
"*1 captures the impacts of labor market’s institutions, !&, represents different 
indicators of human capital, "*2 evaluates the role of institutional quality. However, 
several econometric problems may arise from Equations 1-2: 
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- The independent variables are assumed to be endogenous. Because causality may run 
in both directions – from independent variables to dependent variable and also these 
regressors may be correlated with the error term. 
- Time-invariant individual characteristics (fixed effects) can be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. 
- Introducing lagged dependent variable gives rise to the correlation between the 
regressors and the error term. Because of this correlation, dynamic panel data 
estimation of Equation 3 suffers from the Nickell (1981) bias, which disappears only if 
T tends to infinity. 
In addition, heteroscedasticity is expected to be present because, in the panel data, 
heterogeneous errors might exist with different panel members. To resolve these problems, 
the GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) seems to produce more efficient 
and consistent estimators compared with other procedures. This method also eliminates any 
endogeneity that may be due to the correlation of these country specific effects and the right 
hand side regressors. If we first difference Equations 1-2, we get: 
 
∆	
 = /∆	
 + /∆	 + /∆0
ℎ2	32	456 + ∆     (3) 
 
Equation 3 has removed group effects and time trend. Arellano and Bond (1991) also develop 
the serial correlation test, in which the null hypothesis assumes no serial correlation in error 
term. Arellano and Bond (1991) introduce the tests for serial correlation, often labelled “m1” 
for first-order and “m2” for second-order serial correlation. We expect to find the first-order 
serial correlation in the first differenced residuals. The key problem arises if there is the 
second or a higher order serial correlation, suggesting that some of the moment conditions 
are invalid.  
 
5. Data issues 
Our empirical study is based on an unbalanced annual panel dataset covering various 
individual indicators for thirty-seven selected countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa over the 
period 1990-2011. All these indicators are transformed in the natural logarithm. The sources 
of data sample as well as the list of selected countries are presented in Appendix A. 
Regarding income inequality, several previous studies in the concerned literature use the 
Gini index provided by the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), which are based on 
household surveys. In the WIID, the population and income coverage are comprehensive, 
and different criteria from various sources are homogenized in order to avoid problems of 
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definition (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).2 In addition, another limit of this data set is the 
lack of continuous and consistent inequality data over time (Galbraith, 2009). For these 
reasons, our empirical analysis employs the Gini coefficient (based on net income) from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID, 2014) developed by Solt (2009). 
The SWIID combines information from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and WIID data to 
create a dataset with greater coverage than the LIS data and greater comparability than the 
WIID data. 
With respect to the foreign aid data, we use the share of ODA to GNI. According to the ODA 
definition of WDI, this indicator covers loans and grants from DAC member countries, 
multilateral organizations, and non-DAC donors. It does not reflect aid given by recipient 
countries to other developing countries. As a result, some countries, which are net donors, 
are shown as aid recipients. The indicator does not distinguish types of aid (program, 
project, or food aid; emergency assistance; or post-conflict peacekeeping assistance), which 
may have different effects on the economy. Ratio of aid to gross national income (GNI) 
provides measures of recipient country's dependency on aid. Together with ODA indicator, 
we also introduce in our empirical models six groups of different explanatory variables that 
can affect income inequality.  
- First, we employ two indicators, GDP per capita and its quadratic term, to capture the 
impacts of economic development level. In fact, the link between income inequality 
and economic growth has been widely discussed in the literature, either theoretical or 
empirical. So that, introducing these indicators should be required in all estimated 
regressions. Furthermore, using the quadratic GDP per capita allows us to consider 
the possible presence of an invested-U relationship between economic growth and 
income inequality described by the Kuznets curve. In addition, we use another 
variable to consider the impacts of macroeconomic stability on income inequality, 
notably the annual inflation (INF).  
- Second, in order to account for the possible effects of economic integration, we use 
two alternative indicators. The first one involves the financial integration level that is 
defined and measured as total stock of inward FDI over GDP, which is defined as 
“the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits 
attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the 
parent enterprises” (World Investment Report, 2009). Including FDI inflows allows us 
to revisit the impacts of FDI on income inequality. This issue has also discussed in 
                                                 
2 Problems of definition result from the calculation method of Gini coefficient: whether a category applies to 
household or individuals, whether income is measured gross or net of taxes, and whether expenditure or income 
is used.  
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many theoretical works. For instance, presenting a model of technology transfers 
through the FDI channel, Wang and Blomstrom (1992) suggest that workers with 
more human capital will appropriate more of the beneficial effects of FDI than 
unskilled workers. Focusing on the firm specific nature of FDI, Zhao (1998) examines 
the impact of FDI on wages and employment more directly. According to Zhao, 
inward FDI benefits the workers with greater bargaining power. The second one is a 
standard de facto measure of trade integration – the sum of exports and imports as a 
share of GDP.  
- Third, we take into consideration the relationship between financial development and 
income inequality by introducing in all regressions the ratio between banking credits 
to the private sectors and GDP. This indicator, which measures the development of 
banking sector, allows us to capture the relative importance of private external 
finance in the evolution of income inequality.  
- Fourth, according to Acemoglu (2003a), labor market’s institutions can affect the 
overall level of inequality. To control for this impact, we include in the estimated 
models two variables, notably the minimum wages and the labor market regulations.    
- Fifth, we assume that income inequality of a country depends on its human capital 
factors. For this reason, we should control for the supply side of the labor market by 
using the share of total number of students enrolled in secondary education in total 
population. Nevertheless, the major deficiency is the lack of continuous and 
consistent school enrolment indicators for SSA countries. Therefore, instead of using 
school enrolment indicator, we employ the ratio between education expenditure and 
GNI. We would expect that, higher the education expenditure ratio is, higher the 
investment in education is, that can increase the supply of skilled labor. An increase 
in the skilled labor supply, in turn, can reduce income inequality. 
- Lastly, to capture the possible impact of institutional quality, we introduce a set of 
ﬁve alternative variables. The ﬁrst one (LEG dummies) considers the impact of legal 
origin on ﬁnancial structure. This dummy (LEG1 through LEG5) takes into 
consideration ﬁve different legal origins: British origin, French origin, socialist origin, 
German origin and Scandinavian origin. The second one POLITY2 is the democracy 
index that reﬂects government type and institutional quality based on freedom of 
suffrage, operational constraints and balances on executives, and respect for other 
basic political rights and civil liberties. POLITY2 ranges from–10 to 10 with higher 
values representing more democratic regimes. The third one DURABLE is the 
political stability index, using the number of years since the last regime transition or 
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independence. The fourth one COX narrowly measures the constraints on the 
executive. All of these three indexes POLITY2, DURABLE and PCI are derived by 
Marshall and Taeggers (2003). The fifth one is a widely used indicator of government 
quality (GQ) in a broader sense, which is suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2010), 
derived by averaging six measures of GQ: voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, light regulatory burden, rule of 
law and freedom from graft. The last one involves the level of corruption. We 
consider that the effectiveness of foreign aid strongly depends on the corruption level 
of a country. In other words, corruption can change the nature of the relationship 
between foreign aid and income inequality. For this reason, we introduce in all 
estimated regressions the interactive term between foreign aid and corruption.  
<Insert Table 1> 
Table 1 summarized the dataset and provides means and standard-errors of dependent and 
independent key variables. Additionally, Table 1 reports the correlation coefﬁcients between 
income inequality and all covariates. It can be seen that income inequality variable displays 
considerable variation both between and within countries, justifying the use of panel 
estimation techniques. As shown in Table 1, most of correlation coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant. 
This result aids the modelling and helps to conﬁrm the choice of dependent variables. 
However, the values of correlation coefﬁcient are diverse, ranging from negative to positive, 
from small to important. For instance, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant value of correlation 
coefﬁcient between Gini coefficient and ODA flows, while that between Gini coefficient and 
GDP per capita is significantly positive. On the other hand, income inequality seems to be 
positively correlated to economic integration in terms of both trade and finance. The 
empirical results show that the magnitudes, the statistical signiﬁcance even the sign of 
correlation coefﬁcient have been more or less altered. Thus, we should not be surprised to 
see different empirical results on the relationship between income inequality and 
macroeconomic variables. 
  
6. Empirical results 
This section reports the empirical results of the GMM estimator and robustness tests. It also 
outlines the results’ implications for the considered theoretical hypotheses and discuses 
policy recommendations. First of all, Table 2 represents the empirical results using the GMM 
estimator with robust standard errors for four different models:  
- Model 1 considers only the relationship between aid and income inequality. 
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- Model 2 considers only the relationship between aid and income inequality and 
controls for the impact of corruption on this relationship. 
- Model 3 includes other macroeconomic variables.  
- Model 4 includes other macroeconomic variables and controls for the impact of 
corruption on the relationship between aid and income inequality.  
<Insert Table 2> 
Table 2 reports all econometrical results in two parts. The upper shows the estimated 
coefficients for each GMM regression. The lower presents the serial correlation test. 
Accordingly, the first order serial correlations (m1) are expected because of first differencing, 
p-values obtained suggest no significant second order serial correlation (m2). Thus, we 
should reject the null of the absence of ﬁrst order serial correlation and not reject the absence 
of second order serial correlation. This result implies that our estimated models satisfy the 
required orthogonal conditions.  
 
Impact of foreign aid. Going straight to the hypothesis of interest, we note that in the 
bivariate models, the estimated coefficients of foreign aid are positive and statistically 
significant. This result supports an inequality increasing effect of foreign aid on income 
distribution. In addition, this impact is quantitatively weak: an increase in the share of aid in 
GNI by 1 unit leads to an increase in the Gini coefficient by 0.027 unit. The unwanted impact 
of aid on inequality can be explained in several ways. First, donors may be motivated by 
other considerations, such as strategic interest, retribution of allies or even colonial past, 
which are not necessarily in conformity with MDGs. Second, the excessive monitoring of aid 
can disturb the implementation of inequality reduction strategies (Easterly, 2007). Third, the 
ineffectiveness of aid programs can be damageable due to the failure of coordination 
between a large number of aid agencies in SSA (van de Walle, 2003).  On the other hand, the 
failure of aid programs seems to be the consequence of rent seeking by local elites in SSA 
countries and spending foreign aid for personal benefit. In this context, international donors 
should: (i) control the distribution of aid resources in each recipient country by themselves; 
(ii) focus on countries in which institutions restrict rent seeking (Hodler, 2007) and aid is 
used in favor of the poor (OECD, 2006); and (iii) strengthen the conditions of giving aid 
(Boone, 1996).  
However, the positive impact of foreign aid reverses when it is interacted with the level of 
corruption control. The economic implication is that corruption and rent seeking may bear 
major responsibility for the inequality increasing effects of aid in SSA countries. Accordingly, 
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when SSA countries improve their control of corruption, the unexpected redistributive 
impact of foreign aid will be reduced.  
Recalling the discussion in Section 4 that income inequality can be influenced by other 
macroeconomic factors, it should be stressed that the positive relationship between aid and 
Gini coefficient could be over-evaluated in a bivariate model. Nevertheless, in the 
multivariate models with the presence of a wide set of different macroeconomic variables, 
the positive relationship between aid and income inequality tends to be persistent. It means 
that the interaction between aid and inequality has not been altered by the presence of 
macroeconomic environment in the model. On the one hand, ODA flows enter in Model 3, in 
which we do not control for the impact of corruption, with a positive and significant 
estimated coefficient. On the other hand, in Model 4 accounting for the impact of corruption, 
the link between aid and inequality is still positive but becomes statistically insignificant. 
This result allows us to conclude that a good control of corruption can change the nature of 
the aid – income inequality nexus. In other words, an increase in ODA flows can widen 
income inequality in a country without controlling for corruption, while the opposite trend 
can be true in a country with a high level of corruption control.  
We now turn our attention to the impact of other macroeconomic factors on income 
inequality in SSA countries.  
 
Impacts of economic development. GDP per capita enters in all estimated models with a 
positive and significant coefficient, meaning that the Gini value increases with an increase in 
economic growth. Unlike the positive effect of GDP per capita, its quadratic term exerts a 
negative and significant impact on income inequality. These two results support the 
hypothesis of Kuznets (1955, p. 18) “… a long swing in the inequality characterizing the 
secular income structure: widening in the early phases of economic growth when the 
transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming 
stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases". However, if we consider that 
SSA countries have been in the early phase of economic growth, the empirical result is not 
consistent with the pro-poor growth hypothesis that economic growth is good for the poor. 
In other words, economic growth does not contribute to improving the lives of the poor and 
to causing favorable changes in the distribution of income. Another independent variable, 
inflation rate, shows a non-statistically significant coefficient, meaning that income 
inequality does not depend on the price stability in SSA region.  
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Impacts of economic integration. Regarding the impact of financial integration, FDI 
coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant in all regressions. The positive sign of 
FDI implies that inward FDI flows could be associated with widening within-income 
inequalities in SSA. In fact, the new technology has been transferred from developed 
countries to developing countries through the FDI channel. As the multinational firms have 
successfully implemented the new technology in the host country, only skilled labor will be 
required. Consequently, demand for skilled labor steeply increases, thus leading to an 
increase in wage of skilled labor and income inequalities between skilled and unskilled 
labor. This link has been also supported in other earlier empirical studies (e.g. Gopinath and 
Chen, 2003; Basu and Guariglia, 2006). Contrary to what is often asserted trade openness,3 
the trade to GDP ratio is negative but insignificant. It means that trade openness is not 
associated with the changes in income distribution in SSA countries.  
 
Impacts of financial development. Financial development is measured by the share of credit 
to private sectors in GDP. In all regressions, this indicator has such a negative but 
statistically insignificant coefficient. On one hand, the negative sign of financial development 
does not support the basic theoretical assumption of Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor 
and Zeira (1993). According to these authors, financial market imperfections (financial 
asymmetries, transaction cost, and contract enforcement costs) could be especially binding 
on the poor, who lack collaterals, credit histories and network relationships. Consequently, 
even when the poor has projects with high returns, they may still be credit rationed. Under 
such circumstances, the efficiency of capital allocation is reduced and the social mobility of 
the poor is limited. Thus, income inequality rises with the development of financial markets. 
Thankfully, this theoretical hypothesis is not confirmed in the case of SSA countries. The 
statistically insignificant of the credit-GDP ratio can be explained by the fact that the 
domestic financial markets in SSA have not been enough developed to enable the significant 
consequences for the overall distribution of income.   
                                                 
3
 In the concerned literature, developing countries’ imports from developed countries bring more 
sophisticated technology and create a gap between the importing firms, which able to upgrade their 
assets then increase the skilled labor demand, and the rest of firms. This mechanism has been 
explained by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) in the case of trade between Mexico and the USA. In an 
opposite situation, the exporting firms in developing countries are not required to improve the 
technological level of exporting goods, given that most of them are primary commodities. Thus, a 
stable or even increasing demand for unskilled labor in exporting firms and a rising demand for 
skilled labor demand in importing firms may adversely affect income inequality. In general, when a 
developing country opens to trade, they become more exposed to technologies and innovations 
produced in more advanced countries. Hence, trade integration, which should involve technological 
upgrading, leads to a general shift of labor demand towards more skilled workers, a consequent 
increase in wage differentials and a subsequent increase in inequality. 
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Impacts of human capital. As mentioned in Section 4, one of the hypotheses of interest 
involves the impacts of human capital on income inequality in SSA. We consider that an 
increase in education expenditures can improve the quality of human capital in SSA, which 
in turn reduce the Gini coefficient. As reported in Table 2, the sign of education expenditures 
variable is negative as expected but econometrically insignificant. This result argues that 
social expenditure, such as education expenditure, is not a relevant determinant of income 
inequality reduction in SSA.  
 
Impacts of labor market’s institutions. Labor market’s institutions are measured by 
minimum wages and labor market regulations index. Both these indicators enter in all 
regressions with a positive coefficient, but only the coefficient of labor market regulations is 
statistically significant. This unattended result can be explained by the fact that any 
improvement in labor market regulations can create a greater gap between the formal and 
informal sectors in SSA countries, in which the informal economy plays a quite important 
role. In other words, better labor market regulations seems to only favor activities and wages 
of the formal sectors, and consequently widen income inequality between formal and 
informal labor.   
 
Impacts of institutional quality. Institutional quality is captured by a broad set of indicators: 
democracy index; political stability index; constraints on the executive; government quality; 
and control of corruption. On one hand, we find no evidence of the impact political stability 
and executive constraint on income inequality. On the other hand, the coefficients associated 
to other institutional quality indicators show a negative value but once again insignificant. It 
means that institutional quality does not play any role in changing income inequality in SSA. 
This result seems to be consistent with the aid literature, which argues that the quality of 
institutions does not necessarily reduce inequality and poverty (e.g. Easterly, 2007; Calderon 
et al., 2009).  
 
Sensitivity of empirical results 
This sub-section carries out a set of robustness checks to examine the results’ sensitivity to 
alternative estimation strategies and data sub-samples. It is needless to say that ODA flows 
also depend on the historical factors, such as colonial link. If the strategic interests of many 
colonial powers and their colonies are closely linked, former colonial powers tend to provide 
large amounts of aid to former colonies. Another important historical factor is the legal 
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origin of ODA recipient countries. Taking into consideration the potential impact of 
historical factors on the aid-inequality nexus, our first robustness test involves re-estimating 
all regression of interest for two data sub-sample: (i) SSA countries with French legal origin; 
and (ii) SSA countries with British legal origin. The results of GMM estimator with robust 
standard error reported in Table 3-4 show that accounting for the legal origin does not alter 
the conclusion on the impacts of aid in income inequality, only the magnitudes of estimated 
coefficients are little affected. Otherwise, the new empirical results provide two 
complementary results. First, the positive impact of labor institutions is reinforced in the case 
of French legal origin sub-sample, as the coefficient of minimum wage enters in all 
regression with a positive and significant value. Second, the role of economic integration as 
well as democracy in reducing income inequality is confirmed in the case of British legal 
origin countries. However, the Kuznets curve hypothesis is not confirmed in British legal 
origin countries when the estimated coefficients of GDP per capita are not statistically 
significant. This result should be taken with caution, because the absence of a statistically 
significant coefficient does not mean that economic growth is harmful or irrelevant in SSA 
British legal origin countries. This can be explained by the fact that economic growth in these 
countries has not been enough to have significant effects on income inequality, which is so 
high.  
<Insert Table 3-4> 
The second referred robustness check is the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). It is because a problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that 
lagged levels are often weak instruments for first differences, in particular for variables that 
are close to a random walk. As reported in Table 5, the system-GMM results are, by and 
large, similar to those of the GMM estimator in terms of sign and significance, but the 
magnitudes are different as would be expected. In addition, the system-GMM results 
confirm the significant role of democracy in narrowing income inequality in SSA countries.  
<Insert Table 5> 
7. Conclusion 
Using a large sample of twenty-seven SSA countries over the period 1990-2011, the present 
paper investigates the potential aid - inequality nexus. Our empirical findings on the impacts 
of aid as well as other covariates on income inequality are insensitive to a range of datasets 
and estimation methods. On the one hand, considering the difference in legal origin does not 
alter the conclusions. The main results on the link between aid and income inequality hold, 
while others results are affected but qualitatively not too dissimilar. On the other hand, 
employing the system-GMM estimator gives similar results to those of GMM estimator.  
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Our empirical results reveal that aid flows have an inequality increasing effect in SSA 
countries, thankfully it is quite small. This unattended impact can be explained in two ways. 
The first and most popular argument is that foreign aid has ended up in the wrong hands. 
Second, the main motivations of aid donors may involve economic and politic interests, 
which are not necessarily in conformity with reducing income inequality in the less-
developed world. Overall, we expect that aid does not undermine political and economic 
initiatives in recipient countries. However, if national policymakers as well as international 
donors have perverted incentives, aid will be used on less productive and efficient purposes 
(Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).  
On the other hand, we also find that the corruption control can alter the nature of the link 
between aid and income inequality. It means that foreign aid can foster income equality in 
SSA countries in the presence of good corruption control. In other words, the nature of 
redistributive impact of aid, positive or negative, on income inequality effectively depends 
on the level of corruption control in SSA countries.  
To conclude, this study complements the relevant and controversial debate on the inequality 
impact of foreign aid. Our empirical results offer an important implication for policymakers, 
who aspire to reduce income inequality by spurring foreign aid in SSA countries. The fact is 
that foreign aid can only exert an inequality decreasing effect if the corruption is controlled 
in SSA region. In this context, the effectiveness of aid in terms of fostering income equality, 
more than ever, should be enhanced.  
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Appendix A: Data description 
Selected countries 
Low-income (22) Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Central African Republic; Chad; 
Comoros; Ethiopia; Gambia; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mozambique; Niger; Rwanda; Sierra 
Leone; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zimbabwe 
Lower middle income (10) Cabo Verde; Cameroon; Cote d’Ivoire; Ghana; Lesotho; 
Mauritania; Nigeria; Senegal; Swaziland; Zambia; 
Upper middle income (5) Angola; Botswana; Mauritius; Namibia; South Africa; 
Variables Definition Sources 
Gini Coefficient Income inequality indicator Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID 
v.5) 
ODA Share of ODA in GNI (%) World Development Indicators 
FDI Inflows of FDI as a share of 
GDP (%) 
World Development Indicators 
OPEN Share of total exports and 
imports in GDP (%) 
World Development Indicators 
GDPp GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US$) 
World Development Indicators 
INF Inflation rate (%) World Development Indicators 
FD Share of banking credit to 
private sectors in GDP (%) 
World Development Indicators 
MW Minimum wages Fraser Institute, Economic 
Freedom of the World (2008) 
LMR Labor market regulations Fraser Institute, Economic 
Freedom of the World (2008) 
HC Education expenditures (% 
GNI) 
World Development Indicators 
LEG (1-5) Legal origin dummies Global Development Network 
Database (GDN) 
POLITY2 Index of democracy PolityIV Database (Marshall 
and Taeggers, 2003) 
DURABLE Index of political stability PolityIV Database (Marshall 
and Taeggers, 2003) 
COX Constraints on the executive PolityIV Database (Marshall 
and Taeggers, 2003) 
GQ Government quality Author’s calculation from 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
COR Control of corruption Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
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Figure 1: Income inequality in SSA low-income countries, 1990 – 2011 
 
Source: Author’s creation from SWIID database, version 5 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Income inequality in SSA lower-middle income countries, 1990 – 2011 
 
Source: Author’s creation from SWIID database, version 5 
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Figure 3: Income inequality in SSA upper-middle income countries, 1990 – 2011 
 
Source: Author’s creation from SWIID database, version 5 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ODA recipients 1960-2013 (US$ Million) 
 
Source: Author’s creation from OECD-DAC database 
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Table 1: Summary statistics and Correlation coefficients (615 observations) 
Variable 
  
 Mean  
Standard Deviation 
 Min  Max  
Cor. 
coef 
  
 Overall Between Within 
GINI   3.80 
 
0.18 0.16 0.09 
 
3.26 
 
4.34 
 
1.00 
ODA (% of GNI)   2.02 
 
1.24 1.08 0.49 
 
-2.30 
 
4.55 
 
-0.30* 
FDI (% of GDP)   0.07 
 
1.91 1.33 1.48 
 
-13.55 
 
3.84 
 
0.14* 
OPEN (Trade/GDP)   4.12 
 
0.46 0.43 0.19 
 
2.37 
 
5.35 
 
0.34* 
Credit to private sectors   2.50 
 
0.84 0.74 0.40 
 
-0.22 
 
4.43 
 
0.19* 
GDP per capita   6.37 
 
0.94 0.90 0.15 
 
4.74 
 
8.67 
 
0.52* 
Quadratic GDP per capita  41.41  12.86 12.28 2.01  22.42  75.15  0.51* 
Inflation rate   1.94 
 
1.28 0.84 0.98 
 
-3.50 
 
8.33 
 
0.14* 
Education expenditures   1.20 
 
0.56 0.47 0.28 
 
-0.16 
 
4.22 
 
0.26* 
Minimum wage   5.82 
 
3.08 2.84 1.23 
 
0.00 
 
10.00 
 
0.19* 
Labor market regulations   5.95 
 
1.67 1.62 0.48 
 
2.43 
 
9.10 
 
0.05 
Index of democracy   1.20 
 
5.58 4.58 3.26 
 
-9.00 
 
10.00 
 
0.10* 
Index of political stability   10.39 
 
11.47 7.92 8.41 
 
0.00 
 
81.00 
 
0.04 
Constraints on the 
executive 
  -1.57 
 
21.52 11.09 18.53 
 
-88.00 
 
7.00 
 
0.07* 
British legal origin   0.46 
 
0.50 0.50 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.41* 
French legal origin   0.54 
 
0.50 0.50 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
-0.41* 
Government quality   -0.57 
 
0.61 0.59 0.18 
 
-1.82 
 
0.84 
 
0.25* 
Control of corruption   -0.51 
 
0.56 0.52 0.23 
 
-1.52 
 
1.25 
 
0.26* 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at least the 10% level 
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Table 2: GMM estimator’s results 
Independent variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged GINI 0.754*** (0.041)  0.745*** (0.043)  0.687*** (0.050)  0.683*** (0.051) 
ODA  0.027*** (0.011)  0.014* (0.007)  0.015*** (0.005)  0.011* (0.006) 
ODA×Corruption -   -0.011* (0.005)  -   -0.012** (0.005) 
FDI  -   -   0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001) 
OPEN (Trade/GDP) -   -   -0.008 (0.013)  -0.008 (0.013) 
Credit to private sectors -   -   -0.006 (0.013)  -0.005 (0.013) 
GDP per capita -   -   0.369* (0.199)  0.348* (0.188) 
Quadratic GDP per capita -   -   -0.030*  (0.016)  -0.028* (0.015) 
Inflation rate -   -   -0.002 (0.00(2)  -0.002 (0.002) 
Education expenditures -   -   -0.010 (0.011)  -0.011 (0.011) 
Minimum wage -   -   0.002 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002) 
Labor market regulations -   -   0.017** (0.007)  0.017** (0.007) 
Index of democracy -   -   -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) 
Political stability -   -   0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Executive Constraints -   -   0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Government quality -   -   -0.006 (0.019)  0.001 (0.021) 
Control of corruption -   -   -0.024(0.016)  -  
Constant 0.924*** (0.151)  0.933*** (0.161)  -0.034(0.647)  0.069 (0.613) 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value -2.902 (0.002)  -2.936 (0.004)  -2.951 (0.003)  -2.953 (0.003) 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value 1.615 (0.125)  1.507 (0.134)  0 .986 (0.323)  0.886 (0.375) 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): 
Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: GMM estimator’s results for country with French legal origin 
Independent variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged GINI 0.787*** (0.052)  0.790*** (0.047)  0.773*** (0.059)  0.765*** (0.062) 
ODA  0.027** (0.010)  0.019* (0.010)  0.020*** (0.006)  0.015* (0.008) 
ODA×Corruption     -    -   -0.006 (0.005) 
FDI  -   -   0.000 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002) 
OPEN (Trade/GDP) -   -   0.014 (0.018)  0.013 (0.018) 
Credit to private sectors -   -   -0.007 (0.016)  -0.007 (0.017) 
GDP per capita -   -   0.413** (0.138)  0.400** (0.151) 
Quadratic GDP per capita -   -   -0.031** (0.011)  -0.030** (0.012) 
Inflation rate -   -   0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002) 
Education expenditures -   -   -0.011 (0.013)  -0.013 (0.013) 
Minimum wage -   -   0.004* (0.002)  0.004* (0.002) 
Labor market regulations -   -   0.012* (0.007)  0.013* (0.007) 
Index of democracy -   -   0.000 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002) 
Political stability -   -   0.000 (0.001  0.000 (0.001) 
Executive Constraints -   -   0.000* (0.000)  0.000* (0.000) 
Government quality -   -   -0.018 (0.020)  -0.010 (0.018) 
Control of corruption -         -  -0.003 (0.016)  -  
Constant 0.733*** (0.185)  0.729*** (0.166)  -0.647 (0.374)  -0.584 (0.388) 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value -2.548 (0.011)  -2.592 (0.001)  -2.447 (0.014)  -2.447 (0.014) 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value 2.946 (0.349)  2.621 (0.534)  0.470 (0.637)  0.471 (0.637) 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4: GMM estimator’s results for country with British legal origin 
Independent variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged GINI 0.867*** (0.060)  0.843*** (0.058)  0.724 (0.076)  0.724*** (0.076) 
ODA  0.005 (0.007)  0.012 (0.009)  0.022 (0.006)  0.022*** (0.008) 
ODA×Corruption -   -   -   0.009 (0.006) 
FDI  -   -   -0.003* (0.002)  -0.003* (0.002) 
OPEN (Trade/GDP) -   -   -0.038* (0.023)  -0.037* (0.022) 
Credit to private sectors -   -   0.005 (0.013)  0.004 (0.013) 
GDP per capita -   -   0.031 (0.195)  -0.028 (0.212) 
Quadratic GDP per capita -   -   0.004 (0.013)  0.008 (0.015) 
Inflation rate -   -   -0.003 (0.003)  -0.003 (0.003) 
Education expenditures -   -   -0.008 (0.010)  -0.010 (0.010) 
Minimum wage -   -   -0.003 (0.004)  -0.001 (0.004) 
Labor market regulations -   -   0.014** (0.007)  0.014** (0.007) 
Index of democracy -   -   -0.003* (0.002)  -0.003* (0.002) 
Political stability -   -   0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Executive Constraints -   -   0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Government quality -   -   -0.037 (0.042)  -0.043 (0.041) 
Control of corruption -   -   0.002 (0.014)  -  
Constant 0.503** (0.237)  0.593** (0.230)  0.688 (0.663)  0.921 (0.753) 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value -2.254 (0.023)  -2.215 (0.020)  -2.439 (0.014)  -2.424 (0.015) 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value 1.481 (0.148)  1.421 (0.156)  1.084 (0.278)  1.032 (0.302) 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5: Results of dynamic-GMM estimator 
Independent variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged GINI 0.853*** (0.041)  0.859*** (0.041)  0.757*** (0.046)  0.763*** (0.047) 
ODA  0.020*** (0.007)  0.014* (0.008)  0.024*** (0.007)  0.016*** (0.006) 
ODA×Corruption -         -     -0.012** (0.006) 
FDI  -   -   0.002 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002) 
OPEN (Trade/GDP) -   -   -0.030** (0.015)  -0.031** (0.014) 
Credit to private sectors -   -   -0.011 (0.011)  -0.010 (0.012) 
GDP per capita -   -   0.123* (0.069)  0.159** (0.063) 
Quadratic GDP per capita -   -   -0.004** (0.002)  -0.007** (0.003) 
Inflation rate -   -   0.000 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002) 
Education expenditures -   -   -0.023 (0.014)  -0.023 (0.014) 
Minimum wage -   -   0.002 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002) 
Labor market regulations -   -   0.021*** (0.006)  0.022*** (0.006) 
Index of democracy -   -   -0.003* (0.001)  -0.003* (0.001) 
Political stability -   -   0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Executive Constraints -   -   0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Government quality -   -   -0.021 (0.025)  0.009 (0.023) 
Control of corruption -   -   0.009 (0.017)  -  
Constant 0.515*** (0.159)  0.496*** (0.158)  0.290 (0.613)  0.183 (0.587) 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value -3.041 (0.001)  -3.06 (0.004)  -3.246 (0.001)  -3.310 (0.001) 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value 1.567 (0.128)  1.498 (0.176)  0.401 (0.688)  0.308 (0.757) 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
